Marsha is a partner in the firm’s insurance coverage group, which focuses on primary and excess property and casualty insurance coverage and reinsurance.  She and the other members of the insurance coverage team draft manuscripted policies for specialized and captive insurers and complex insurance programs, interpret direct insurance policies and reinsurance contracts, address claims-handling problems, and handle insurance coverage disputes through negotiation and, where necessary, litigation.  Marsha also handles appeals, in insurance as well as in other types of commercial matters.

Marsha Weinstein

Education

 

▪  Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, J.D., 1982

 

▪  Hamilton College, B.A., 1979

 

Bar Admissions

 

▪   New York, 1983

 

Court Admissions

 

▪   United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

 

▪   United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

 

Professional Associations

 

▪   Member, Queens County Bar Association

 

▪   Member, Queens County Women's Bar Association

REPORTED COURT DECISIONS

WCHCC (Bermuda) Limited v. Granite State Ins. Co., U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., 12-cv-00094 (VB), June 10, 2013 (insurer that issued an individual primary professional liability policy to hospital-insured nurse is obligated to pay the limit of its policy toward the sum paid by the hospital’s insurer to settle medical malpractice action on the nurse’s behalf, plus the portion of the defense costs allocated to the nurse)   

 

Clark v. Ravikumar, 90 A.D.3d 971, 935 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep’t 2011) (operative report identified the physicians who participated in plaintiff’s surgery; it was not an “affirmative wrongdoing” that contributed to plaintiff’s delay in suing the hospital and the surgical resident and, as such, hospital and surgical resident were not estopped from asserting their statute of limitations defenses in opposition to plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to add them as defendants and plaintiff’s motion should have been denied) 

 

Great Canal Realty Corp. v. Seneca Insurance Company, Inc., 5 N.Y.3d 742, 800 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2005) (insured property owner’s failure to timely notify its insurer of an accident in which a subcontractor’s employee was injured was not reasonably founded on a good-faith belief of nonliability; insurer granted summary judgment declaring that it is not required to defend or indemnify the insured)

 

Maldonado v. Kissm Realty Corporation, 18 A.D.3d 627, 796 N.Y.S.2d 619 (2d Dep’t 2005) (lessee’s general liability insurer was obligated to defend and indemnify the building owner in a personal injury action by a worker who was allegedly injured while doing repairs to the building’s rooftop heating and ventilation units because the general liability policy stated that the owner was an additional insured with respect to liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the leased premises, and the lessee assumed a maintenance obligation with respect to the rooftop units)

 

Jamaica Public Service Co. Ltd. v. La Interamericana Compania De Seguros Generales S.A., et al., 1 A.D.3d 130, 767 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dep’t 2003) (machinery breakdown insurers had no coverage obligation to electricity supplier for damage sustained by boiler; the evidence conclusively established that the dominant and efficient cause of the damage was the explosion of unconsumed fuel, which was a risk for which the all-risk insurers, but not the machinery breakdown insurers, provided coverage)

 

Lincolnshire Management, Inc. v. Seneca Insurance Company, Inc., 2002 WL 31058285 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 2002) (affirming judgment in insurer's favor, holding that insurer's disclaimer was proper under New York law because insured's notice of claim was late and no evidence supported insured's claim that it had a valid excuse for the delay)

 

Seneca Insurance Company, Inc. v. Lincolnshire Management, Inc., 269 A.D.2d 274, 703 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep’t 2000) (rejecting the “natural plaintiff” theory in New York and holding that New York is not an inconvenient forum in which insurer could litigate the parties’ coverage dispute)

 

MIC Property and Casualty Insurance Corporation v. Custom Craftsman of Brooklyn, Inc., 269 A.D.2d 333, 703 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1st Dep’t 2000) (dismissing insurance coverage action brought by party claiming to be additional insured)

 

The Brooklyn Hospital Center v. Centennial Ins. Co., 258 A.D.2d 491, 685 N.Y.S.2d 267 (2d Dep’t 1999) (although medical treatment did not take place during insurer’s policy period, insurer was estopped from disclaiming coverage after defending the hospital in medical malpractice action for 11 years without a reservation of rights)  

 

People v. Cook, 85 N.Y.2d 928, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1995) (defendant’s felony conviction was reversed and a new trial was ordered where the defense attorney was given no advance notice of a note provided to the Court during deliberations advising that the jury was at an “emotional impasse”; the Court’s refusal to provide defense counsel with an opportunity to suggest responses to the note was inherently prejudicial, not harmless, because it prevented the defendant of participating meaningfully in a critical stage of the trial; the trial Court also erred in admitting evidence of property recovered from  defendant’s clothing by a police officer before defendant was arrested, identified as a participant in the crime, or connected in any identifiable way to the crime being investigated)

 

Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Company, 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep’t 1988), aff’d 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989) (establishing applicability of standard pollution exclusion to environmental pollution claims)

 

Hickey v. Peninsula Hospital Center, 135 A.D.2d 781, 522 N.Y.S.2d 893 (2d Dep’t 1987) (dismissing wrongful termination claims of at-will hospital employee because, at best for plaintiff, statements contained in hospital’s personnel policy and procedural manual constituted general policy statements and supervisory guidelines and did not indicate that plaintiff’s employment was subject to termination for just and sufficient cause only)

Correspond With Marsha Weinstein